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Abstract 
The pervasiveness of the entrepreneurial phenomenon draws scholars’ attention as to what 
determines the decision to become an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial decisions imply 
judgemental decisions. Different approaches in economics conceive judgemental decisions  
as firm entry, or real investment in the creation of a new business, or making a career choice 
in favour of a particular type of self-employment. The literature on entrepreneurs’ features, 
motives and markets is then enriched with  theoretical and empirical results from  industrial 
organization, financial economics and labour economics.  
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1. Introduction and motivation 
Since Schumpeter (1954) defined an entrepreneur as “the pivot on which everything turns”, 
research into entrepreneurship has grown rapidly. Many surveys and reviews have been 
written about entrepreneurship especially in the last twenty years (e.g., Casson, 1990; 
Gartner, 1990; Bull and Willard, 1996; Glancey and McQuaid, 2000; Storey, 2000; 
Swedberg, 2000; Westhead and Wright, 2000; Audretsch, 2002; Acs and Audretsch., 2003; 
Casson, 2003; Shane, 2003; Casson, 2006; Casson, 2010) and a huge number of conferences, 
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workshops and debates have been devoted to this topic. However, despite this prominent role 
in “both popular culture and the historical record” (Casson, 2003), both twentieth-century 
mainstream economic theory and modern economic textbooks fail to adequately integrate 
entrepreneurship into economic theory.  
 As Bygrave and Hofer (1991) observe, “A major challenge facing entrepreneurship 
researchers in the 1990s is to develop models and theories built on solid foundations from 
the social sciences.” Although economics is the logical discipline in which a theory of 
entrepreneurship should emerge, the entrepreneur has rarely been studied within the context 
of the basic neoclassical framework of economics. Brock and Evans (1989) note that 
“Economists have concentrated overwhelmingly on large businesses”. The leading textbooks 
in economics have little or no discussion of small businesses or entrepreneurs” (Eisenhauer, 
1995). Mainstream economic theory takes the existence of markets as given and regards 
competition as an impersonal process (XX) where the wholesale price coordinates supply 
and demand, or where they are adjusted by an auctioneer, or where new firms enter when 
extra profits are available and exit as soon as they have been eroded. In such a framework, 
“entrepreneurs disappear from view” (Casson, 2003). When entrepreneurs are eliminated 
from the market process, buyers and sellers must interact directly with each other; however, 
in practice, in most markets they are relatively passive. In the real world, it is entrepreneurs 
who publish price quotations and compete most intensely with each other;: buyers and 
sellers simply choose from the “menus” provided by the entrepreneurs. Furthermore, when 
entrepreneurs are eliminated from the market process, economists tend to regard firms as 
producers who do not even decide on when to enter the market.1 As a result, the knowledge 
exploited by firms is assumed to relate to production technology, whereas in fact it relates 
mainly to supply and demand. 
                                                 
1 It is the presence of extra profits that provokes entry. 
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 Managerial studies on entrepreneurship have built on the need to improve upon this 
role of mere coordinator where the entrepreneur is far from being a decision-maker. A 
number of studies explicitly developed for entrepreneurship began to explore this issue 
further by looking at personal traits and delineating the peculiarities of an entrepreneur with 
respect to other economic agents: attitude in coping with risk (Cantillon, 1759) or 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), alertness (Kirzner, 1983), creativeness (Schumpeter, 1942; 
1954), imagination (Shackle, 1970). It is assumed that the entrepreneurial decision is 
stimulated not by the expectation of maximizing wealth depending on the characteristics of a 
temporary disequilibrium of the market, but as an individual manifestation of specific 
attitudes: these traits may be linked to agents’ preferences such as risk attitudes or ability in 
making use of information.  
 Next, a bunch of models (e.g. Casson, 1982; Campbell, 1992) tried to link the roles 
of personal features and of external economic conditions related to specific industries (like 
the type of occupation, location, wages and human capital) and modelled the entrepreneurial 
decision by assuming that the expected reward of entrepreneurship is compared to the best 
alternative use of time by the potential entrepreneur. The total costs related to the 
entrepreneurial decision cover both actual money costs (i.e. venture capital) and 
psychological costs like the “fear of personal embarrassment and loss of self-esteem, and the 
potential fear of having to find alternative employment”.  
 Casson (1982; 2003) provides a further attempt at synthesizing these issues in a 
coherent and general model where an entrepreneurial function is identified as common to all 
approaches: this is the exercise of judgement in decision-making. The essence of judgement 
is the following: “where there is no obvious decision rule, and no readily available source of 
public information, different people will use different procedures to arrive at a given 
decision and will therefore act differently in the same situation” (XX). The entrepreneurial 
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act becomes something more than the carrying out of new combinations: it requires the 
ability to evaluate opportunities, which is not common to everybody. 
 This idea of judgemental decision puts the grounds for going beyond canonical 
thinking as it focuses very sharply on the nature of judgement. This allows us to study the 
entrepreneur by examining, among others, the factors influencing the demand and supply of 
judgement, the characteristics and peculiarities that entrepreneurs should demonstrate as 
judgemental decision-makers, the motivational aspect behind the decision in favour of a job 
where judgemental decisions are part of the every-day agenda, and the role of profits or rents 
in rewarding judgement. Furthermore, we believe this concept opens up the possibility of 
finding some useful insights about the entrepreneurial decision from other branches of 
economic theory. We argue that the failure of economists to integrate the entrepreneur into 
economic theory could be not absolute if we consider the possible meanings that the 
entrepreneurial “judgemental” decision assumes. From an industrial organization point of 
view, the entrepreneurial decision corresponds to a firm’s entry into an industry. Recent 
contributions to the theory of the firm discuss the relations between entrepreneurs, firms, 
industries and markets, and these insights can be used to investigate how entrepreneurial 
judgemental decisions are shaped by industry specificities, through information, level of 
competition, degree of maturity and so on.  
 From a financial point of view, the entrepreneurial decision represents a specific case 
of real business investment. Here, judgemental decisions concern aspects like the optimal 
type and timing of such a real investment and the evaluation of alternative investment 
opportunities.   
 Finally, from a labour economics perspective the entrepreneurial decision is the result 
of a specific career choice in favour of a form of self-employment characterized by 
judgemental decisions. 
 5
 This paper aims to widen the implications of considering the entrepreneurial decision 
as a judgemental decision. The entrepreneur can be alternatively depicted as a newcomer, a 
(real) investor or a (self-employed) worker and the discussion considers not only economic 
studies that explicitly speak of entrepreneurship, but also works on strictly related 
phenomena. To be complete, a synthetic theory of the entrepreneurial decision needs to 
account for all those contributions that proficiently integrate the comprehension of the 
entrepreneurial role(s) and function(s). The aim is to develop a theory that encompasses 
these strands of literature by appropriately defining the term of entrepreneur and some basic 
assumptions on entrepreneurial motives, traits, and environment.  
 
2. The entrepreneurial decision as an “entry” decision  
The industrial organization literature conceptualizes the entrepreneurial decision as “entry” 
of a new firm into a market. More specifically, Mueller (1991) refers to a “firm that supplies 
a product within an industry without having supplied it previously”. As seen above, 
traditional industrial economics models reflect the neoclassical attitude of emphasizing this 
decision as playing a re-equilibrating function: when an industry demonstrates extra profits 
with respect to long-term market equilibrium (where entry does not occur), new firms come 
in and “erode” these rents. The probability of entry is negatively affected by the presence of 
barriers that might prevent potential entrants from exploiting profitable market opportunities 
and allow incumbent firms to earn super profits. Thus, it is industry characteristics, in terms 
of both industry profitability and the level of structural or behavioural barriers, that 
determines or not a firm’s entry decision. In mainstream entry models, firms are assumed to 
be homogeneous with respect to their cost functions and to the amount of information they 
are provided with. As discussed above, the market is exogenously given and new-entrant 
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firms make decisions that cannot be classified as judgemental because they represent only a 
coordination act. 
 Nonetheless, more recent entry models emphasize the issues of information and 
judgement, opening up an active role of entrepreneurs in driving the entry decision. A key 
concern regards the interplay between information characteristics and the specificity of the 
industry where the entrepreneurial decision takes place, and the moment when it occurs.  
The concept of “technological regime” (Nelson and Winter, 1982) devotes attention to the 
technological attributes of the industrial environment: appropriability of the innovative rents, 
cumulativeness of technological advance, level of technological opportunities and 
characteristics of knowledge. The features of the entry process cannot be generalized across 
different industries: some technological conditions favour entry more than others, as the 
industry might evolve in a direction that widens the spectrum of available opportunities and 
competences required or deepens existing ones. Analogously, Audretsch (1995) suggests two 
possible models describing industry evolution: the “revolving door” that captures high 
turbulence and difficulty in surviving (and corresponds to Nelson and Winter’s “routinized 
regime”), and the “metaphor of the forest” where new entrants displace established firms that 
grounded their roots in the industry and force them to exit (as in the “entrepreneurial 
regime”). 
 Studies on the industry life cycle (e.g. Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 
1996) emphasize the importance of considering the specific stage of evolution of the 
industry. Grounding on previous works by Abernathy and Utterback (1978), this kind of 
analysis stresses that entry is much easier in the early stages of evolution: a radical 
innovation gives birth to a new industry, entry barriers are low and product innovations 
frequent. As the industry evolves toward maturity, output grows considerably, the number of 
versions of the product decline and more investment is devoted to process innovation: 
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barriers to entry become significant, entry rates decrease and a shakeout occurs in the 
number of producers.  
 Another group of models in industrial organization explicitly focuses on the role of 
information and uncertainty in affecting the entry decision. The essence of the decision to 
enter lies in firms’ willingness to discover their own true efficiency level that determines the 
probability of surviving and prospering. A model in which uncertainty represents a key 
ingredient in the explanation of entry is suggested by Jovanovic (1982): firms do not know 
exactly how good their own capabilities are: by means of a mechanism of “noisy selection”, 
some of them are discovered to be more efficient than others, survive and prosper while less 
efficient ones decline and exit. Firms in this case are no longer “black boxes”, but 
entrepreneurs who do make judgemental decisions and whose performance depends on the 
evolution and maturity not only of the decision-maker, but of the industry and/or the 
environment as well. 
In a similar way, the model described by Horvath et al. (2001) shows the relevance of 
uncertainty and information disclosure in determining entrants’ decisions. After observing 
other firms’ performances, potential entrants reduce their uncertainty: the greater the number 
of firms in the market, the broader the information available to potential entrants and the 
higher the frequency of entry choices that is governed by a self-reinforcing mechanism.  
 Therefore, many recent contributions in industrial organization can successfully 
contribute to modelling the entrepreneurial decision by pointing out that: (1) the 
entrepreneurial decision is a judgemental decision in so far as only entrepreneurs can deal 
with information idiosyncratically related to an industry and to the specific moment when 
entry should take place. Industrial organization theories that account for these aspects find 
higher confirmation in data about entry. Furthermore, (2) recent contributions in industrial 
economics have tried to integrate the analysis of entry determinants related to the industrial 
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structure with an investigation of the biases and limitations that can affect firms’ decisions, 
in a perspective that exhibits some similarities with attention towards personal traits in 
entrepreneurship theory. Potential entrants’ expectations of success determine entry choice, 
but these expectations may be affected by mistakes that concern one’s own abilities and 
probability of success. Individual suboptimality can still drive the market to optimality, but 
individual and social welfare analyses should be carried out separately. The most famous 
contribution is represented by Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) paper that stresses the 
importance of overconfidence in leading the entry decision and shows that entrants can 
predict the number of competitors correctly, but are unable to evaluate their performance 
with respect to their peers. Not only do they overestimate their capabilities, but also seem to 
reason as if they were alone in the competitive arena (“reference group neglect” 
phenomenon). This work opened up a strand of literature that involves psychological 
insights in understanding the entry decision (e.g. Moore and Cain, 2005; Moore et al., 2007; 
Hogarth and Karelaia, 2010). Several studies show how entrepreneurs’ failures in intuitive 
reasoning may play a role in the findings of a number of recent studies in entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs seem to be affected by cognitive biases like those qualified as heuristics by 
Kahneman et al. (1982). Cooper et al. (1988), among others, show that entrepreneurs 
perceive their prospects for success as substantially better than those of similar businesses. 
Moreover, their degree of optimism appears to be higher if they have already made the 
commitment to become business owners: the theory of cognitive dissonance studies 
decision-makers’ attitudes to bolster or exaggerate the attractiveness of an option after it has 
been chosen (Abelson and Levi, 1985).   
 Thus, the determinants of entry should concern not only the features of the industry 
where it takes place (observed in a specific moment), but also the way in which entrants 
frame their decisions and the possible distortions affecting them.  
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3. The entrepreneurial decision as an “investment” decision 
A few works (since the seminal work by Dixit, 1989 and in more recent papers like O'Brien, 
et al., 2004; Grenadier and Wang, 2007; Das et al., 2007) belonging to the financial area 
conceptualize the entrepreneurial decision as a particular case of real business investment. 
Investment is usually a macro concept, studied at an integrated level: in elementary 
macroeconomic models, the private investment flow plays a crucial role in connecting real 
markets and monetary markets. Aggregate investment depends on an individual firm’s 
choice: since in orthodox neoclassical theories macroeconomics and microeconomics are not 
distinctly different disciplines, analysing macroeconomic investment is analytically identical 
to analysing microeconomic investment, because both theories describe the profit-
maximizing behaviour of firms balancing their marginal costs and benefits.  
 If a firm can instantaneously and inexpensively adjust its capital stock, then - as in 
Jorgenson’s (1963) work - its decision about how much capital to use is a static decision 
where the marginal product of capital is equated to the user cost of capital. The investment 
literature, however, has emphasized the presence of two types of friction: adjustment costs 
and irreversibility. The adjustment cost literature (since the contribution by Eisner and 
Strotz, 1963) assumes the adjustment cost function to be strictly convex and have a value of 
zero at zero investment. In the 1970s and 1980s, this literature merged with the literature on 
Tobin’s q (Tobin, 1969), that is centred on the fact that the optimal rate of investment is an 
increasing function of the ratio of the firm’s market value and the replacement cost of the 
firm’s capital. Mussa (1977) and Abel (1982) argued that the optimal rate of investment is 
the rate that equates the marginal adjustment cost to the marginal value of installed capital 
(marginal q).  
 On the other hand, the fact that investment might be irreversible represents another 
type of friction affecting the investment decision. Irreversibility makes investment especially 
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sensitive to various forms of risk, such as uncertainty over future product prices and 
operating costs that determine cash flows, uncertainty over future interest rates, and 
uncertainty over the cost and timing of the investment itself. An investment is made a sunk 
cost by the fact that capital is firm- or industry-specific, so that it cannot be used 
productively elsewhere. Dixit (1989) investigates entry (and exit) decisions as forms of 
investment (and disinvestment) that occur in an environment characterized by uncertainty. 
Hysteresis, defined as the failure to reverse an effect when its causes have been reverted, is 
the main feature in this setup. Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pyndick (1994) emphasize the 
analogy between real and financial investment decisions and conceptualize the opportunity 
of making an irreversible investment as a call option on a stock that consists of the capital in 
place. Standard financial economics techniques are used to find the “price of the option” (i.e. 
the value of the entry opportunity for the firm) and the rule concerning the “optimal timing 
of exercising the option” (i.e. the optimal timing of entering) after which the option to enter 
is “killed”: the investor gives up the possibility of waiting for new information that might 
influence the appeal of this investment itself. Performing an irreversible investment in the 
creation of a new firm when payoffs are stochastic means sacrificing the option to invest in 
the future: to maximize profits, therefore, “one must balance the profits foregone by delaying 
entry against the option value relinquished when entry has occurred” (Lambrecht and 
Perraudin, 2003). This might imply that the optimal entry timing tends to occur later than the 
first date when the present discounted value of future cash flow exceeds zero. Intuition 
suggests that an idle firm will enter when demand conditions become sufficiently favourable, 
and an active firm will abandon [the market] when they become sufficiently adverse. Dixit 
(1989) shows that the optimal strategy for this kind of investment and abandonment will take 
the form of two threshold prices. In most real-world situations, the demand and cost 
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conditions a firm faces change all the time, and the firm must make its entry and exit 
decisions taking into account that the future is uncertain.   
 Among recent contributions in this field, O’Brien et al. (2004) provide not only an 
empirical test of the influence of irreversibility on an entrepreneur’s sensitivity to 
uncertainty, but also advance theory by proposing that the irreversibility of entrepreneurial 
entry decisions may be influenced by industry, firm, and even individual level factors. 
Consistent with predictions derived from real options theory, this paper shows that high 
uncertainty in the target industry dissuades entry, and that the irreversibility of the entry 
decision moderates this relationship.  
 Huisman et al. (2003) deal with the effects of strategic interactions on the option 
value of waiting associated with investments under uncertainty. Whereas the real option 
literature mainly considers intrinsic uncertainty that will always exist regardless of a firm 
having invested or not, their contribution investigates another kind of uncertainty, which is 
uncertainty that reduces because of information that becomes available over time. A key 
feature of the latter kind of uncertainty is that the information is imperfect, and we believe 
this is the type of uncertainty that arises when judgemental decisions occur. For example, 
when a new communication technology is introduced and the entrepreneur opens such a new 
market, there will always be uncertainty about the demand for the new service, depending on 
the business cycle, the unemployment rate and so on. On the other hand, there is uncertainty 
about the level of structural demand for the new service. With the help of market research 
the entrepreneur could gain more insight into structural demand, which decreases 
uncertainty. Since a marketing survey consists of a sample and not an entire population, the 
signals that it provides on the profitability of an investment are imperfect. 
 In brief, according to the option theory approach, when framing the entrepreneurial 
decision as an investment decision new insights can be derived on the judgements 
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entrepreneurs have to make. The investment decisions are not sufficiently alike or recur 
sufficiently often to warrant the development of routine procedures. Since their information 
requirements are difficult to anticipate in advance, the appropriate strategy is to concentrate 
responsibility for a decision on a suitable individual, i.e. the entrepreneur. He collects 
information from different sources in order to make a risky decision (Casson, 2003). 
 Again, it is the information that entrepreneurs can acquire by observing an uncertain 
environment – like price reflecting supply or demand conditions - that turns out to be crucial 
in determining an entrepreneurial decision and stimulating it at a specific moment. Thus, 
when the entrepreneurial decision is explicitly analysed, and framed as an investment 
decision, contextual factors related to information play a major role: framing the 
entrepreneurial decision as an investment decision implies that the opportunity cost of 
founding a new venture takes into account alternative forms of investment of the 
corresponding amount of money (e.g. real estate, bond, equities and so on).  
 
4. The entrepreneurial decision as a “self-employment” decision 
The literature in labour economics has devoted a lot of effort into investigating the 
entrepreneurial decision that has been conceptualized as “self-employment”. ‘Entrepreneur’ 
became the favoured appellation for anyone who was self-employed or a small-scale 
employer; even economists got in on the act, and described anyone who chose self-
employment as an alternative to unemployment or waged employment as an ‘entrepreneur’ 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Since Osborne (1976), these works have depicted the 
entrepreneurship decision as involving the choice between two income streams: a rational 
individual can decide to accept a waged position earning a certain amount of money per 
year, or go into business with the anticipation of receiving a share of profits. 
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 According to the definition prevailing in labour-market statistics, self-employment 
does not correspond exactly to entrepreneurship because the self-employed are not 
necessarily innovative entrepreneurs pursuing growth-enhancing business projects. 
However, the two phenomena can be considered equivalent with a good level of 
approximation: also the literature shows some overlap. As emphasized above, we believe the 
difference lies in the fact that the entrepreneur is specialized in making choices that require 
an intensive use of judgement (Casson and Wadeson, 2007b). 
 The approach based on labour economics reinterprets the entrepreneur opportunity 
cost in terms of alternative uses of time and leisure more than liquidity and shows how 
motivational factors might become crucial when the entrepreneurial decision is perceived as 
a career choice. The proliferation of econometric works investigating the determinants of 
self-employment was motivated by the sharp increase in self-employment that occurred in 
Europe, the United States and Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, after a downward trend that 
had persistently characterized the period 1910-1970 (Fairlie and Meyer, 2000). This stylized 
fact strongly suggests that a fundamental change had occurred in advanced industrial 
economies that made self-employment more attractive.  
 Possible explanations have initially concerned the presence of changes in an 
industrial structure; price shifts in favour of industries where self-employment was relatively 
common; rising marginal tax rates in a context where the ease of underreporting income is 
higher for self-employment; increased wage rigidity that rationed a proportion of paid 
workers out of waged jobs; rising real retirement benefits that enabled higher flexibility and 
“partial retirement”.  
 Parker (1996) summarizes these explanations into two categories: the first views self-
employment as the outcome of adverse conditions in the paid employment sector (“recession 
push” theories); the second emphasizes the presence of pull factors like lower tax rates, 
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greater ease of hiring and firing and “rejuvenated entrepreneurial spirit” in the supply side of 
the economy (Hughes, 1992). Both push and pull theories consider the returns from self-
employment as being of central importance and have been recently discussed by Schjoedt 
and Shaver (2007).  
 Hamilton (2000) classifies models explaining the self-employment choice that were 
based on the assumption of wealth maximization in three categories. First, investment and 
agency models (e.g. Lazear, 1981; Lazear and Moore, 1984) claim that self-employment 
differentials derive from differences in earning profiles across sectors. While the expected 
present value of self-employment income is equal to the paid employment alternative for the 
marginal worker, a cross-sectional earning differential may exist as a result of sectoral 
differences in earnings or in the experience profile due to patterns of career earnings’ growth 
in paid and self-employment. The investment model argues that the self-employment earning 
profile will be steeper than for those in paid employment because human and capital 
investment are not shared with an employer in self-employment; agency models explain the 
steeper earning profiles of paid employment, referring to the need to discourage shirking 
since agency problems are not present in self-employment.  
 Second, matching and learning models (e.g. Roy, 1951; Jovanovic, 1982) emphasize 
that earning differences arise from differences in sector-specific abilities. Individuals have 
unobserved, time-invariant, sector-specific abilities and human capital: earning differential 
therefore may reflect selection effects that cause workers to choose the sector where they 
have a relative advantage (individuals may know immediately in which sector they fit best 
or, because of uncertainty, they may need some time to decide), and low-ability 
entrepreneurs are expected to drop out of self-employment.  
 Third, “superstar” theory (Rosen, 1981) argues that the comparison between self-
employment and paid work can be significantly influenced by a handful of high income 
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entrepreneurial superstars. Small differences in skills might be magnified into large 
disparities in returns in the labour market characterized by imperfect substitution among 
different sellers and in which the costs of production do not rise in the same proportion to the 
size of a seller’s market. MacDonald (1988) demonstrates that, as in the learning models, 
workers who realize they are not “rising stars” tend to return to paid employment. 
 Although these models focus on the pecuniary motives of entrepreneurial choice and 
have generally shown a good explanatory power, expected monetary earnings can turn out to 
be insufficient for clarifying choice in favour of self-employment and especially of 
entrepreneurship. As Hamilton (2000) emphasizes, differences in non-pecuniary aspects may 
lead to compensating earning effects for equally productive workers. A popular view is that 
entrepreneurship offers a higher level of freedom in the work environment that can be 
translated into the possibility of being “one’s own boss”. Evans and Leighton (1989) show 
that individuals preferring higher autonomy are more likely to become self-employed. 
Conversely, Kanbur (1982) emphasizes the role of risk-aversion in the self-employment 
decision: business owners may earn a risk premium because of a higher uncertainty in their 
earnings. Risks may have a temporal structure, so that the entrepreneurial decision is 
influenced by impatience levels: by entering a risky activity an agent can acquire 
information about his ability, which is useful for future occupational choice. In equilibrium, 
risk-taking has the characteristics of postponed gain relative to the safe alternative, so that in 
an environment with lower time rates of discount more risk-taking activities will be 
observed. These explanations based on love for freedom/autonomy, risk-seeking preference 
and patience present several features in common with the idea of personal traits in 
entrepreneurship theory. Still drawing upon Knight’s (1921) notion that individuals respond 
to risk-adjusted relative earnings, Rees and Shah (1986) carried out an exhaustive empirical 
work with the aim of throwing further light on the binary choice between self-employment 
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and paid work: self-employment has been shown to be generally regarded as being more 
risky since, on average, the coefficient of variation of self-employment earnings is over three 
times that of paid-employment earnings. Another important determinant, however, is given 
by the nature of the work involved. The attractions of self-employment are the flexibility and 
independence entailed; on the other hand, self-employment usually implies a greater number 
of working hours and a higher level of responsibility, so that it can be mentally and 
physically more demanding. Moreover, education affects the choice primarily by reducing 
the coefficient of variation in self-employment earnings: in fact, education serves as a filter 
such that the more educated are more likely to be uniform in their abilities; furthermore, they 
tend to be better informed, implying a greater efficiency when assessing self-employment 
opportunities. Concerning the influence of age, data show that there is a tendency for 
employees to switch to self-employment towards the end of their working life as an 
alternative to retirement (Quinn, 1980); however, the old can be less likely to take risks than 
the young. Health is expected to affect self-employment through work characteristics: longer 
hours and greater responsibility imply that the less healthy might find self-employment 
status too demanding. 
 Eisenhauer (1995) claims that the decision to become an entrepreneur may be viewed 
as an occupational choice motivated by economic factors: an individual is assumed to decide 
to undertake a new venture if it is expected to make him or her better off. The individual 
utility function is generally defined by wealth (consisting of two components: existing net 
assets and the present value of future income) and working conditions and increases in both. 
An individual perceives a latent consumer demand for a good and sees the opportunity to 
launch a new venture. Subjective estimates of revenues and costs are formulated; a venture is 
worthwhile if the utility of venturing exceeds the utility of not venturing. The difference 
between the present values of venture and non-venture incomes can be interpreted as an 
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expected risk premium. As empirical studies indicate that risk aversion declines as wealth 
rises (e.g.  Szpiro, 1986), the risk premium necessary to induce an entrepreneurial decision 
will be smaller the greater the value of initial wealth. This suggests that success in 
entrepreneurship, by increasing wealth, can reduce the entrepreneur's degree of risk aversion, 
and encourage more venturing. Entrepreneurship may therefore be a self-perpetuating 
process. Moreover, if the venture conditions are preferable to working conditions in the 
wage sector, then a venture may be acceptable even if the risk premium is negative; this may 
explain Gunderson's (1990) idea that most new businesses are “life-style choices” where the 
likelihood that the income will be less than that derived from a comparable effort working 
for someone else is compensated by other kinds of returns. On the other hand, certainty has a 
negative value for risk-seeking individuals: Brockhaus (1980) provides evidence that at least 
some entrepreneurs demonstrate mild risk-loving behaviour, but in general there is no clear 
result of this correlation. Douglas and Shepherd (2002) describe entrepreneurs in terms of 
the strength or weakness of their attitudes toward income, independence, risk, and work 
effort and investigated the effect these attitudes have on the intention to start one's own 
business, finding that the strength of intention to become self-employed is significantly 
related to a respondent’s tolerance for risk and preference for independence.  
 If personal attitudes towards risk and autonomy appear to be crucial in determining 
the choice of self-employment, a further assumption is needed when we speak of 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are aware that everyday life and work will be concerned 
with judgemental decisions: they feel sufficiently confident to deal with them everyday and 
look for this type of stimulus. Entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage in collecting and 
processing information, such that they succeed in recognizing opportunities: when new 
scarcities arise, opportunities emerge to economize on the scarcer resources and 
entrepreneurs are encouraged to seek out those projects which help the economy to adapt to 
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changing conditions (Casson and Wadeson, 2007b). This skill in processing information can 
be regarded as one of the components of human capital: “It is not the routine managerial skill 
of taking decisions according to procedures, but rather the skill of judging what these 
procedures should be. It is also the skill involved in taking decisions in unexpected business 
situations where ordinary procedures do not apply” (XX). From this perspective, 
entrepreneurship is one of a number of inputs that contributes to the overall performance of 
the economy.  Together with the other components of human capital – skilled manual labour 
and routine management – it may be considered as a factor input into the economy that 
improves the allocative efficiency of the economy (ibidem). 
 In brief, theories in labour economics frame the entrepreneurial choice as a career 
choice, and this argument has strong implications in terms of the attention that is devoted to 
motivational aspects of the decision. The interest in personal characteristics recalls the idea 
of the importance of personal traits in entrepreneurship theory. Here, personality features are 
interpreted more explicitly as engines of entrepreneurial choice and involve complex 
considerations on what is needed to make judgemental decisions and on how judgemental 
decisions affect motivations. 
 
5. A synthesis  
The sections above have shown how economic theories may differ in defining the 
entrepreneur, his motives and characteristics, and the environment in which he operates. 
What clearly emerges is that “it is difficult to encapsulate all the insights of the theory of 
entrepreneurship into a single model” (Casson and Wadeson, 2007a). A major challenge 
when arranging the theoretical framework to an encompassing model is to fix 
straightforward but sufficiently general assumptions to “do justice to the heterogeneity of the 
economy” (ibidem). Furthermore, this paper faces the additional challenge of constructing 
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assumptions that could be useful for models of entrepreneurship in different strands of the 
literature: industrial organization, real business investment, labour economics. 
 
5.1. Defining the entrepreneur 
When modelling the entrepreneurial decision we need first to define what is an entrepreneur. 
The choice of the definition grounds on the specific research questions scholars are 
concerned with and on the objectives of the model. According to Casson (1982), there are 
four main approaches to defining an entrepreneur, which emphasize respectively function, 
role, personal characteristics and behaviour. As argued above, we define the entrepreneur 
according to his function, which then determines his role: he is specialized in taking a 
“judgemental decision”. However, this definition might be insufficient in stressing flair, 
imagination and creativity and “there is the need for constructing a theory that will predict a 
pattern of behaviour that appears creative and imaginative” (Casson and Wadeson, 2007a). 
This lies in the ability to recognize and exploit opportunities and correctly predict the 
demand for novelty. Differently from other decision-makers involved in firm life, the 
entrepreneur’s function consists of internalizing the “market for newly-discovered 
opportunities” (ibidem).  
 Economic theories discussed in the previous sections account for several forms of 
judgemental decisions: consequently, the entrepreneur has to deal with a specific type of 
uncertainty that is related to the context where the decision takes place and to the way in 
which the decision is framed, and this shapes the opportunity cost of being an entrepreneur. 
The uncertainty the entrepreneur has to face regards market entry into a specific industry, the 
investment process, or the career course. Whether judgement affects the creation of a new 
market or entry into an established one, the entrepreneur has to acquire information on the 
industry (its stage of development, maturity, level of competition, and so on) and the 
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competitors, and evaluate the opportunity costs of operating in a different industry or not 
entering the new market. When judgement regards the profitability or convenience of 
choosing a real investment, the entrepreneur has to acquire and administer information about 
alternative types of investment (for instance, in bonds or equities or real estate) and about the 
timing of when it is optimal to spend the option. When judgement is about an entrepreneur’s 
own career, uncertainty concerns not only personal attitudes and satisfaction in preferring 
self-employment, but also wage and rent conditions. Thus, our focus on judgemental 
decision succeeds in constructing a definition that enables us to account for an entrepreneur 
who operates as a new entrant, as a real business investor and as a self-employed worker. 
Further specifications depend on which branch of economic theory the model belongs to.  
 
5.2. Assumptions on characteristics 
The definition discussed above implies that the entrepreneur has a peculiar ability for 
recognizing opportunities and facing non-measurable uncertainty. The subjectivity of 
opportunities explains why some people recognize opportunities where other people do not 
(Loasby, 1976). Opportunities need to be discerned because they are not clearly labelled and 
it is the entrepreneur that has the talent to make this judgemental decision. Although 
situational and personality measures have been shown to fail to significantly predict 
entrepreneurial activity (Krueger et al., 2000), empirical observation suggests that 
imagination, creativity and the attitude to deal with uncertain scenarios are common features 
in individuals who decide to become entrepreneurs. Which assumptions on rationality derive 
from the entrepreneur’s attitude towards the discovery of opportunities and uncertainty?  
 Following Casson and Wadeson (2007b), we assume that entrepreneurs are “meta-
rational”, in the sense that they optimize the amount of information they collect. This implies 
that they face a trade-off between the costs of collecting additional information and the 
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benefit of reducing the risk of a mistake (i.e. missing a profitable opportunity, or exploiting 
an unprofitable opportunity by confusing it with a profitable one).  The amount of 
uncertainty entrepreneurs face depends on their own decisions on how much information to 
collect: if they are willing to pay an information cost to widen their knowledge on market, 
competitors, industries, personal abilities and so on, they can process additional information. 
The scarcity of information is addressed by economizing on its use: collecting the whole 
amount of information required to guarantee the correct decision would be too expensive. 
Meta-rational individuals are “instrumental and purposeful” in the sense that they pursue 
given ends (Mises, 1949), but they are only “boundedly rational” rather than “substantively 
rational”, in the sense that they do not normally act upon full information (Simon, 1983). 
Thus, we assume entrepreneurs as boundedly rational individuals who demonstrate a 
particular ability for processing costly information on industries, markets, competitors and 
personal attitudes with the aim of reducing uncertainty. 
 
5.3. Assumptions on motives 
The central role of judgemental decisions in the entrepreneur’s acts affects the assumptions 
on the motives and reasons behind the choice of becoming an entrepreneur. Two key issues 
arise: why do individuals decide to become entrepreneurs? What is the nature of 
entrepreneurial reward?  
 From a private point of view, the immediate purpose of exploiting an opportunity is 
to make a profit. Opportunity recognition, stimulated by the prospect of profit, encourages 
entrepreneurs to seek out the projects which help the economy to adapt to changing 
conditions: since Kirzner (1973), it is the prospect of profit from an opportunity that 
motivates the search that leads to discovery. As the economy adapts to changing conditions, 
new opportunities arise as fast as others are destroyed: the exploitation of opportunities is a 
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vital part of the economy as a response to external shocks. As seen above, the view that 
agents would choose activities yielding the highest private returns comes naturally to 
industrial organization, financial and labour economists. More specifically, as entrepreneurs 
deal with judgemental decisions, entrepreneurs’ profit can be interpreted as a premium for 
the uncertainty within the judgement.  
 Besides these considerations on pecuniary motives, the judgemental nature of the 
entrepreneurial decision moves the attention onto the need for satisfying some non-pecuniary 
desires, e.g. for status or self-esteem or other personal needs. If the decision is judgemental, 
motives are no longer only pecuniary (see above the discussion on self-employment models) 
but based on the need for facing such a type of decision. The ends pursued by entrepreneurs 
may be non-materialistic: some choices offer them emotional rewards, based on personal 
recognition and social status (the will to win) and the chance of creating a legacy (the desire 
to found a dynasty). 
 Furthermore, there is another perspective to account for. From a social point of view, 
entrepreneurs’ motives may not only be related to a desire to seek for private rewards, but 
also to increase social welfare. This process presents some similarities to the concept of 
“coordination” in economic models, but, due to our peculiar definition of the entrepreneurial 
decisions, this coordination activity is grounded on the capability to deal with uncertainty 
that other agents are not able to handle. As commonly occurs, private and social benefits are 
unlikely to be aligned when we talk about entrepreneurs (Casson and Wadeson, 2007a).   
 
5.4. Assumptions on markets 
Our definition implies that entrepreneurs are active “market-makers” who create new 
markets by introducing new products (Casson, 1982; 1997). The assumptions on the markets 
where entrepreneurs operate are shaped by this fact. The entrepreneurs’ environment is 
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volatile due to transitory or temporary shocks, and new opportunities are constantly being 
created. As seen above, an opportunity may arise because of a change in demand conditions, 
or a change in supply conditions, or a change in whatever (as transport, communication or 
institutional arrangements) makes it easier to match supply to demand (Casson and 
Wadeson, 2007a). In the absence of the entrepreneur there would be no markets at all: the 
volatility of consumer demand for novelty is important in generating a demand for 
entrepreneurship.  
 Focusing on the entrepreneur as a market-maker points out some interesting insights 
on information and uncertainty. Industrial organization assesses a crucial role for the 
industrial structure, whereas finance looks at the uncertain matching between market 
conditions, and labour economics focuses on individuals’ labour markets and possible career 
patterns. The entrepreneur is not merely a producer who supplies a product, and the presence 
of a pre-existing market is incompatible with our definition. The only assumption we make 
about markets is that they are endogenously determined by the mutual interplay of demand 
and supply and the specific market structure that arises and the way that entrepreneurial 
rewards are determined are uncertain ex ante. Furthermore, it is necessary to specify all the 
markets we need to model: the market originated by the new good derives from an 
opportunity exploited by the entrepreneur and gives rise to a market for entrepreneurship, but 
also business investments and labour markets are affected by this process.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to build up an integrated investigation of the entrepreneurial 
decision. We follow Casson (1982) in defining the entrepreneur as characterized by the 
exercising of judgemental decision, and consequently able to handle uncertainty and acquire 
costly information. In this perspective, literature in the entrepreneurship field may be 
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insufficient to generate a comprehensive framework of judgement, uncertainty and 
information. Thus, different strands of the literature within the economics approach have 
been reviewed. We aim at formulating simple and general assumptions on entrepreneurs’ 
features, acts and motives that can be common to studies on entrepreneurship in industrial 
organization, financial economics and labour economics, although each approach presents its 
own peculiarities. When the entrepreneur’s judgemental decision is depicted as entry, 
knowledge about markets, competitors and industries is crucial. When it deals with an 
investment decision, uncertainty regards the profitability and the timing of exercising the 
option to invest in a real business. When it is framed as a career choice, knowledge about the 
labour market and personal abilities and attitude is required. 
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